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indigEnous rights – holloW rights?
By valMainE toki*
i. introduction
The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“the Declaration”) was the initiative of the 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations (“WGIP”). Established in 1982, the mandate of the 
WGIP was to develop international standards concerning Indigenous peoples’ rights. The Decla-
ration was a manifestation of this mandate and a clear articulation of international standards on the 
rights of Indigenous peoples. It was not until 25 years later, in September 2007, that the final text 
was adopted by the General Assembly with a majority of 143 states in favour. Eleven states of-
fered abstentions.1 Four states opposed adoption: Australia, Canada, the United States of America 
(“the United States”) and New Zealand.
This position has now changed with Australia,2 New Zealand,3 Canada4 and the United States5 
all signalling their support of the Declaration. While perceived as a major moral victory, a closer 
analysis of the wording provides concern about intentions to meaningfully recognise the Indig-
enous rights articulated in the Declaration. This undermines the nature of the rights and questions 
whether these are mere hollow rights.
To ascertain whether these rights are indeed hollow, after providing a background to the gen-
esis of the Declaration and highlighting the key provisions, including that of self-determination 
and participation, this paper will analyse the wording of the support that has been offered by 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States. Part two will address the legal effect of the 
Declaration. In conclusion some thoughts will be provided as to a creative way forward to realise 
the Indigenous rights articulated in the Declaration.
* Ngäti Wai, Ngäpuhi, Member United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 2011 – 2013, Lecturer, Faculty 
of Law, The University of Auckland.
1 Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa and 
Ukraine.
2 Jenny Macklin “Statement on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (2009) <www.
jennymacklin.fahcsia.gov.au/statements/Pages/un_declaration_03apr09.aspx>.
3 “Announcement of New Zealand’s Support for the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” <www.converge. 
org.nz/pma/NZ%20UNDRIP%20statements.pdf>.
4 “Canada’s Statement of Support on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (2010) 
<www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ap/ia/dcl/stmt-eng.asp#tphp>.
5 Susan E Rice “Announcement of U.S. Support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples” (2010) Available also at <usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2010/153009.htm>.
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ii. Part onE
A. Indigenous Peoples – Indigenous Rights
The Declaration provides no definition of Indigenous peoples. Sha Zukang offers this definition:6
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre- 
invasion and pre- colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from 
other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those territories, or parts of them. They form at present 
non- dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future genera-
tions their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity as the basis of their continued existence as peo-
ples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal system.
The rights of Indigenous peoples that have been recognised are essentially those associated with, 
and intrinsic to, their custom and culture, such as control over their lands and resources.7 For the 
Sami peoples, it was the watershed Alta case that provided the catalyst for recognition of their 
Indigenous rights to resources.8 In Australia the Aboriginal peoples have sought recognition of 
title to their land in a series of cases illustrated by Mabo,9 and in Canada recognition was sought 
through the Calder case.10 In New Zealand the Attorney General v Ngäti Apa case11 also centred 
on determining land and resource rights and the rights of due process.12
B. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Rights
Perceived as a major triumph the Declaration13 is the only international instrument that views 
Indigenous rights through an Indigenous lens.14 As a Declaration, the orthodox view is that it will 
not be legally binding upon the states.15 However, it provides a benchmark as an international 
standard, against which Indigenous peoples can measure state action, and a means of appeal in the 
6 Sha Zukang “State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples” ST/ESA/328 (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Division for Social Policy and Development, United Nations, New York, 2009) at v.
7 The realisation of these rights are recognised as a form of self-determination.
8 Henry Minde “The Challenge of Indigenism: The Struggle for Sami Land Rights and Self-Government in Norway 
1960–1990” in S Jentoft, H Minde and R Nilsen (eds) Indigenous Peoples, Resource Management and Global Rights 
(Eburon, Netherlands, 2003) at 75. 
9 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR; Wiks Peoples v Queensland (1996) 121 ALR 129.
10 Calder v Attorney General of British Columbia [1973] SCR 313.
11 Attorney General v Ngäti Apa [2003] NZCA 117.
12 These instances of progress have sometimes been reversed: for example, the ensuing Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 
vested ownership of the foreshore in the Crown, limiting any customary claim. Although this Act has now been re-
pealed, with the Takutai Moana Act, customary claims are still limited.
13 “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Adopted by the General Assembly 13 September 
2007” (2007) <www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/declaration.html>.
14 It is acknowledged that ILO Conventions 107 and 169 also recognise Indigenous rights. However, unlike ILO Con-
ventions 107 and 169, the Declaration has been adopted and/or endorsed by the majority of States.
15 Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (7th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) at 4.
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international arena.16 Portions may also represent binding international law. According to Profes-
sor James Anaya:17
the Declaration may be understood to embody or reflect, to some extent, customary international law. 
A norm of customary international law emerges – or crystallizes – when a preponderance of states … 
converge on a common understanding of the norm’s content and expect future behaviour to conform to 
the norm [emphasis added].
The Declaration opens with general statements. Articles 4 and 5 then provide fundamental addi-
tions from the perspective of Indigenous people’s rights:
Article 4
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-
government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing 
their autonomous functions
Article 5
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, 
social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the 
political, economic, social and cultural life of the State
The Declaration clarifies and places Indigenous peoples within a human rights framework.18 It 
recognises Mäori, the Indigenous peoples of New Zealand, as a collective, not just as individuals.
The Declaration contains more than 20 provisions affirming Indigenous peoples’ right to par-
ticipate, as a group, in decision making. It emphasises Indigenous peoples’ right to participate as 
a core principle and right under international human rights law. In particular Article 18 provides:
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their 
rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as 
to maintain and develop their own Indigenous decision-making institutions.
Further articles supporting this right to participate as Indigenous peoples are articles 19 and 20 of 
the Declaration. Article 19 states:
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the Indigenous peoples concerned through their own 
representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting and 
implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them.
The more significant right is contained in article 20. This provides:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political, economic and social sys-
tems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and develop-
ment, and to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic activities.
2. Indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and development are entitled to just and 
fair redress.
16 See generally Megan Davis “United Nations Reform and Indigenous Peoples” (October 2005) 6(14) Indigenous Law 
Bulletin at 12. 
17 S James Anaya International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples (Aspen Publishers, New York, 2009) at 80. Kiri 
Toki “What a Difference a Drip Makes: The Implications of Officially Endorsing the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (2010) 16 Auckland UL Rev at 243; Claire Charters “Developments in Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights under International Law and Their Implications” (December 2005) 21 NZULR at 519; and Paul 
McHugh The Mäori Magna Carta (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1991) contains a general discussion on the 
development of Indigenous rights through international instruments at 203–227.
18 Rainforest Foundation US “Promoting Indigenous Rights Worldwide: S James Anaya” (7 July 2009) Blogging the 
Rainforest <rainforestfoundationus.wordpress.com>.
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Article 3, the Declaration’s most notable, provides:
Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
The principle of participation in decision-making has a clear relationship with Indigenous peo-
ples’ right to self-determination, which includes more particularly the right to autonomy or self-
government, and the state’s obligation to consult Indigenous peoples in matters that may affect 
them based on the principle of free, prior and informed consent. These legal concepts are integral 
to the right of Indigenous peoples to participate in decision-making.
C. Endorsement
1. Australia
Initially New Zealand, together with Canada, Australia and the United States, did not adopt the 
Declaration during the final vote in 2007.19 Australia was the first to reverse its position and of-
ficially endorsed the Declaration on the 3 April 2009.
Official endorsement requires a clear, unequivocal statement, which preferably takes place in 
the General Assembly.20 Applying this standard questions the nature of Australia’s endorsement.
The statement made by Jenny Macklin was not delivered in the General Assembly, but in Par-
liament House.21 However, Jenny Macklin’s speech was not delivered on the floor of the House of 
Representatives so, correspondingly, there is no recognition in Hansard.
A closer examination of the wording of her statement reveals ambivalence. Jenny Macklin 
stated:22
On 17 September 2009, 143 nations voted in support of the Declaration. Australia was one of four coun-
tries that voted against the Declaration. Today, Australia changes its position. Today, Australia gives our 
support to the Declaration [emphasis added].
Rather than announce that Australia endorses the Declaration Macklin noted that Australia 
“changes its position” and “gives [its] support” to the Declaration. For academics, including Roth-
well, “these features of Australia’s announcement cast serious doubts as to whether any legal ef-
fect will arise”.23 Academics assert that in light of these facts the High Court of Australia would 
not hold this statement as legally binding.24
2. New Zealand
In 2007 New Zealand objected to four articles within the Declaration: article 26 (the right to land 
and resources), article 28 (the right to redress or fair, just and equitable compensation) and articles 
19 and 32 (the right to obtain free prior and informed consent and the right of veto over the state). 
The then New Zealand Labour government viewed these articles as fundamentally incompatible 
19 United Nations Department of Public Information “General Assembly Adopts Declaration on the Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples: ‘Major Step Forward Towards Human Rights for All’, says President” (2007) General Assembly 
GA/10612 < www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm>.
20 Toki, above n 17. 
21 Jenny Macklin was the Minister of Indigenous Affairs in Australia at the time of Australia’s endorsement. 
22 Macklin, above n 2. 
23 Toki, above n 17.
24 Ibid, for discussion on Rothwell.
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with its constitutional and legal norms.25 In particular there was reluctance to accept Article 19, 
which provides for meaningful participation in decision-making. Rosemary Banks, the New Zea-
land Permanent Representative to the United Nations, stated that New Zealand’s existing meas-
ures were adequate:26
We strongly support the full and active engagement of Indigenous peoples in democratic decision-mak-
ing processes – 17% of our Parliament identifies as Mäori, compared to 15% of the general population. 
We also have some of the most extensive consultation mechanisms in the world, where the principles of 
the Treaty of Waitangi, including the principle of informed consent, are enshrined in resource manage-
ment law. But these Articles imply different classes of citizenship, where Indigenous have a right of veto 
that other groups or individuals do not have.
Following Australia’s announcement of support, approximately year later, on 20 April 2010, 
Minister Pita Sharples, from the General Assembly in New York during the ninth session of the 
United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and Hon Minister Simon Power, from 
Parliament, announced that New Zealand would be reversing its position and officially endorsing 
the Declaration.27
Unlike Australia this announcement was made in the General Assembly and in New Zealand’s 
Parliament (so, unlike Australia, it was noted in Hansard),28 however the wording of the endorse-
ment is parallel to Jenny Macklin’s statement. In his address to the United Nations Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues, Minister Sharples stated:29
In September 2007, at the United Nations, 144 countries voted in favour of the Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples. New Zealand was one of four countries that voted against the Declaration. Today, 
New Zealand changes its position: we are pleased to express our support for the Declaration [emphasis 
added].
New Zealand used similar terms to Australia in that it did not state it “reversed” its position, nor 
that it “endorsed” the Declaration. This raises questions on the intention of the statement and the 
nature of the endorsement. Minister Sharples then proceeded to outline two specific areas where 
New Zealand would not follow the Declaration: land and resources, and Indigenous involvement 
in decision-making:30
In particular, where the Declaration sets out aspirations for rights to and restitution of traditionally held 
land and resources, New Zealand has, through its well-established processes for resolving Treaty claims, 
developed its own distinct approach.
That approach… maintains, and will continue to maintain, the existing legal regimes for the ownership 
and management of land and natural resources.
….
25 Rosemary Banks “Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Explanation of Vote” (2007) New Zealand 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade <www.mfat.govt.nz/Media-and-publications/Media/MFAT-speeches/2007/0-
13-September-2007.php>.
26 Ibid.
27 Simon Power (2010) 662 NZPD 10229 or <www.parliament.nz/en-NZ/PB/Debates/Debates/6/5/a/49HansD_ 
20100420_00000071-Ministerial-Statements-UN-Declaration-on.htm>.
28 Minister Pita Sharples announced New Zealand’s support in the General Assembly to the United Nations Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues. The accompanying announcement was made by Hon Simon Power in Parliament in the 
form of a Ministerial Statement. This dual announcement was legally significant. 
29 Power, above n 27.
30 Power, above n 27.
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Further, where the Declaration sets out principles for Indigenous involvement in decision-making, New 
Zealand has developed, and will continue to rely upon its own distinct processes and institutions that af-
ford opportunities to Maori for such involvement. These range from broad guarantees of participation and 
consultation to particular instances in which a requirement of consent is appropriate [emphasis added].
Minister Sharples is identifying two areas where New Zealand held reservations; Article 26 (the 
right to land and resources) and Article 19 (the rights of obtaining free prior and informed con-
sent). However, it is unclear whether states can place reservations or caveats on their endorse-
ments, supporting some articles, but reserving support on others.31
Minister Sharples statement is consistent with the previous comments from Rosemary Banks 
in 2007 when stating the position for New Zealand. The reluctance of the New Zealand govern-
ment to acknowledge fully the rights of Indigenous peoples is consistent with its earlier position 
on the League of Nations.32
It was the opinion of the government that these provisions were fundamentally incompatible 
with New Zealand’s constitutional and legal arrangements, the Treaty of Waitangi, and the princi-
ple of governing for the good of all our citizens.33 However, unlike ratifying an international treaty 
or covenant, it is unclear whether selective endorsement is acceptable.
Reservations to human rights treaties are contentious, particularly where the extent of a res-
ervation undermines the goals of the treaty.34 To selectively endorse an aspirational human rights 
declaration contradicts the principles of indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights. 
Selective endorsement would appear to be the antithesis of what a morally aspirational document, 
such as a Declaration, seeks to achieve.
Despite concerns over what constitutes official endorsement, the issue, concerning the effect 
and role of the reservation or caveat New Zealand placed on the Declaration, is far more problem-
atic. In his announcement to the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Minister 
Sharples qualified New Zealand’s endorsement. He stated:35
In moving to support the Declaration, New Zealand both affirms [the Declaration’s] rights and reaffirms 
the legal and constitutional frameworks that underpin New Zealand’s legal system. Those existing frame-
works, while they will continue to evolve in accordance with New Zealand’s domestic circumstances, 
define the bounds of New Zealand’s engagement with the aspirational elements of the Declaration [em-
phasis added].
31 The International Law on Treaties Art 2(1)(d) states that a “reservation” means a unilateral statement … made by a 
State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty whereby it purports to exclude or modify 
the legal effects of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State. See also Malcolm Evans and Pat-
rick Capps (eds) International Law (Ashgate Publishing, England, 2009) particularly Jonathan Charney “Universality 
or Integrity: Some Reflections on Reservations to General Multilateral Treaties”.
32 Warrick A McKean “The International Law of Non-Discrimination” in Warrick A McKean (ed) Essays on Race Re-
lations and the Law in New Zealand (Sweet & Maxwell, Wellington, 1971) at 1, where the then New Zealand Prime 
Minister Massey was concerned that the treatment of Mäori would come under international scrutiny.
33 For full discussion Banks, above n 25. 
34 N Baird “To Ratify or Not: An Assessment of the Case for Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties in 
the Pacific”(paper presented to 10th Pacific Islands Political Studies Association (PIPSA) Conference, Port Vila, 
Vanuatu, 2007) at 18, where Baird notes that reservations to Declarations can also be a way of “parking” an issue 
which may disappear off the radar for years. See also United Nations Yearbook of the International Law Commis-
sion (1997) 2(2). A/CN.4/SER.A/1997/Add 1 (Part 2) at 44–157. Available also <untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/1_8.
htm>.
35 United Nations Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1997) ibid.
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This reservation or caveat provides that New Zealand’s legal and constitutional frameworks will 
“define the bounds of New Zealand’s engagement” with the Declaration. However Article 46(1) 
of the Declaration provides that:36
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as… authorizing or encouraging any action which would 
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and inde-
pendent States.
Further, the preambular text reaffirms this position and the statements by Minister Sharples mere-
ly reinforce Article 46 of the Declaration. However, it is the specific mention by Minister Sharples 
of the land settlements and decision-making processes that indicate a clear rejection of the rel-
evant articles in the Declaration.
To be able to “adhere to certain aspects of a Declaration and not others defeats the aspirational 
nature of the entire document, however, if a State could, this would mean that New Zealand may 
be exempt from the land, resource and political decision-making clauses of the Declaration”.37
Whilst official endorsement signals a degree of support, the nature of the specific wording and 
the caveat depict New Zealand’s intention. This caveat appears in past New Zealand statements. 
Minister Power’s statements in 2009, Rosemary Banks’ statements in the Explanation of New 
Zealand’s vote to the General Assembly 2007, and former Minister in Charge of Treaty of Wait-
angi Settlement Negotiations, Doug Graham,38 were all consistent in indicating that the Declara-
tion would only be endorsed “provided that we can protect the unique and advanced framework 
that has been developed for the resolution of issues related to Indigenous rights”.39 This historical 
line may “add weight to the caveat New Zealand has placed on the Declaration”.40
The issues surrounding the nature of the wording, what constitutes an official endorsement, 
and the effect of the caveat are far from clear.41 However New Zealand’s official endorsement of 
the Declaration provides a clear moral obligation on the New Zealand government to adhere to the 
rights contained in the Declaration.
3. Canada and United States
On 12 November 2010, the Canadian Government announced its support for the Declaration.42 
One month later, on 16 December 2010, the United States43 also lent its support to the Declaration.
The terminology does not include the term “endorsement” but instead that of “statements”, en-
dorsements being the stronger language. Both refer to the Declaration as being not legally binding 
and not a statement of current international law44 or, similarly, that it does not reflect customary 
international law nor change Canadian laws.45 Both refer to the aspirational nature of the Decla-
36 Article 46(1) of the Declaration.
37 Toki, above n 17.
38 Doug Graham “The New Zealand Government’s Policy” in Alison Quentin-Baxter (ed) Recognising the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 1998) at 6.
39 Ibid.
40 Toki, above n 17.
41 United Nations Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1997) above n 34.
42 “Canada’s Statement of Support”, above n 4.
43 Rice, above n 5.
44 Ibid, at [2].
45 “Canada’s Statement of Support”, above n 4, at [4].
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ration.46 The language of the statements employs terms such as “reaffirming” or “continuing” the 
states’ commitment to Indigenous people.47
The nature of this language “qualifies” Canadian and United States’ support of the Declara-
tion. Similar to New Zealand and Australia, the support of the Declaration comes with reserva-
tions or caveats.
According to the Government of Canada:48
…[Canada’s] concerns with various provision of the Declaration, including provisions dealing with 
lands, territories and resources; free, prior and informed consent when used as a veto; self government 
without the recognition of the importance of negotiations; intellectual property; military issues; and the 
need to achieve an appropriate balance between the rights and obligations of Indigenous peoples, member 
States and third parties.
Nonetheless it is the opinion of the International Organisation of Indigenous Resource Develop-
ment, and Wilton Littlechild that:49
These concerns are a result of a mischaracterization of the relevant articles of the Declaration … these 
concerns can be addressed in a positive way through the application of relevant Treaty principles between 
the Crown and Indigenous peoples in Canada. These include the principles of sharing, mutual consent, 
inherent rights, peaceful co-existence and partnership… the preambular paragraph 15 states:
Considering also that treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements, and the relationship they 
represent, are the basis for a strengthened partnership between Indigenous peoples and States
On this analysis the “support” of the Declaration elicited by these four countries is problematic, 
compromising the rights contained within. This questions whether these rights are mere hollow 
rights. Nevertheless the Declaration continues to have a legal effect in different jurisdictions.
iii. Part tWo
A. Legal effect of the Declaration
The orthodox view is that the Declaration is soft law50 and will not be legally binding upon the 
state51 unless it is incorporated into domestic legislation. The doctrine of state sovereignty pro-
vides a restriction on international instruments, such as the Declaration, to regulate matters within 
the realm of the state.52
46 Ibid, at [3]; Rice, above n 5, at [2].
47 “Canada’s Statement of Support”, above n 4, at [1] and last para; Rice, above n 5, at [1].
48 “Canada’s Statement of Support”, above n 4, at [13].
49 Wilton Littlechild on behalf of International Organization of Indigenous Resource Development, submission to the 
United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues pre-sessional meeting, Ottawa, Canada April 2011.
50 The term “soft law” refers to quasi-legal instruments that do not have any legally binding force. The term is tradi-
tionally associated with international law including most resolutions and declarations of the United Nations General 
Assembly.
51 Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (7th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) at 4.
52 S James Anaya “The Rights of Indigenous People to Self-determination in the Post-Declaration Era” in Claire Char-
ters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds) Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs, Copenhagen, 2009) at 194. See also 
International Law Association “The Hague Conference (2010): Rights of Indigenous Peoples” Interim report (2010) 
<www.ila-hq.org/.../9E2AEDE9-BB41-42BA-9999F0359E79F62D>.
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1. Incorporation
In Bolivia, the recently promulgated Constitution has fully incorporated the collective rights of In-
digenous peoples, including those rights contained in the Declaration.53 Bolivia’s Electoral Tran-
sition Law created seven special Indigenous electoral districts and, for the first time, Indigenous 
peoples in Bolivia have direct representation in the Legislative Assembly. Nonetheless Indigenous 
leaders believe that the current number of electoral districts does not give Indigenous peoples 
enough voice in the Assembly. The intention is that the new electoral law will propose a fairer 
representation system.54 Ecuador has also incorporated the Declaration into its new Constitution, 
the Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador 2008.
If New Zealand followed this approach and incorporated the Declaration into domestic legisla-
tion the onus would be on the New Zealand government to provide to Mäori the ability to fully 
participate in decision-making matters that would affect them socially, politically and economi-
cally. As in Bolivia, discrete legislation could be enacted to ensure meaningful Indigenous repre-
sentation in government.55
2. Legal reception
How the Declaration is received depends, in part, on the respective jurisdictions of the area. For 
instance, notwithstanding the current status of the Declaration as soft law, Chief Justice Conteh in 
the Supreme Court of Belize found that:56
Given the Government’s support of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples… which em-
bodies the general principles of international law relating to Indigenous peoples… the Government will 
not disregard the Declaration [emphasis added].
Belize is a common law jurisdiction. Should reliance be placed on the Declaration this decision 
provides persuasive authority to, for example, establish the ability for Mäori to fully participate in 
decision-making affairs.
In New Zealand the utilisation of the Declaration in a judicial forum is not novel. The Wait-
angi Tribunal has positively referred to the then Draft Declaration in respect to claims of tino 
rangatiratanga.57 The High Court in Ngäi Tahu Mäori Trust Board v Director General of Conser-
vation also referred to the Draft Declaration.58
If Mäori engaged in a judicial challenge to realise their right to participate fully in the decision-
making process, reliance could be placed on Conteh CJ’s comments in Cal & Ors v the Attorney 
53 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights on the Activities of Her office in the Plurinational State of Bolivia” (2010) United Nations Human Rights 
Council A/HRC/13/26/Add.2 18 at [4] <daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/120/56/PDF/G0912056.
pdf?OpenElement>.
54 Ibid, at [16]. 
55 Also see discussion by Naomi Kupuri “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the African Con-
text” in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds) Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declara-
tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs, Copenhagen, 2009) 
at 255, on the Ilchamus (Indigenous) community who successfully took a case to claim that their rights to political 
representation were violated. The presiding Judge took into consideration the then draft Declaration to determine this 
case in favour of the Ilchamus community.
56 Cal & Ors v the Attorney General of Belize & Anor (2007) Claim Nos 171 and 172 of 2007, Conteh CJ (Belize Sup 
Ct) at [132].
57 “The Taranaki Report: Kaupapa Tuatahi” (Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 1996) Wai 143 <www.waitangi-tribunal.
govt.nz/reports/view.asp?reportid=3FECC540-D049-4DE6-A7F0-C26BCCDAB345>.
58 Ngäi Tahu Mäori Trust Board v Director General of Conservation [1995] 3 NZLR 553.
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General of Belize & Anor. Mäori could argue that, as New Zealand has endorsed the Declaration, 
the government should not disregard these general principles therein.
In the absence of direct incorporation by statute there are different methods of recognising 
international human rights instruments including recourse through administrative law. First, the 
(outdated) concept of legitimate expectation in Australia,59 and mandatory relevant consideration 
in New Zealand,60 have been utilised to treat unincorporated international obligations as consid-
erations for the decision maker. Also, the presumption of consistency, a common law principle 
of statutory interpretation, recognises that Parliament is presumed not to legislate intentionally 
in breach of its obligations.61 Zaoui v Attorney-General applied this presumption using New Zea-
land’s international law obligations.62
If Mäori were to appeal against the recent granting by the New Zealand Government of mining 
licences to Petrobas,63 reliance could be placed on Article 32 of the Declaration for the protection 
of their land rights. Article 32 states:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the develop-
ment or use of their lands or territories and other resources.
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the Indigenous peoples concerned through their 
own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval 
of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with 
the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources [emphasis added].
This reliance contextualises the right provided for in s 4 of the Crown Minerals Act, where the 
Minister shall have regard to the principles of the Treaty including that of partnership. Mäori 
would need to prove that the New Zealand Government, as the decision-maker and Treaty partner, 
had failed to take into account this provision of obtaining free and informed consent, as a manda-
tory consideration, when granting the mining licences.
Notwithstanding the success in the application of administrative law to recognise international 
obligations in Zaoui, Gieringer expresses some concern in the application of the principle of man-
datory relevant considerations.64 It should be noted, however, that despite these concerns, Gier-
inger still considers Tavita to be good law,65 and recourse to the principle of mandatory relevant 
consideration to recognise the Declaration’s provision for full participation of Mäori in decision-
making is available.
59 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 (HCA).
60 Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257; (1993) 11 FRNZ 508; (1993) 1 HRNZ 30 (CA).
61 Philip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (3rd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2007) at 533; 
Treasa Dunworth “Public International Law” [2000] NZLR 217, 225, states this area is shrouded in much uncer-
tainty. See for example, Brind v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1991] 1 All ER 720 (UK).
62 [2004] 2 NZLR 339. See also Claudia Gieringer “International Law Through the Lens of Zaoui: Where is New Zea-
land At?” (2006) 17 PLR 318.
63 Gerry Brownlie “Petrobas to Go Ahead as Planned” (2010) Guide2 <www.guide2.co.nz/politics/news/petrobras- 
exploration-to-go-ahead-as-planned-minister/11/17548>.
64 Gieringer, above n 62.
65 Gieringer, above n 62.
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B. Application of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi – an aid?
Wilton Littlechild proposes that application of Treaty principles, such as partnership, can assist to 
bridge the gap between the recognition of an Indigenous right and the relevant article in the Dec-
laration. Is this a viable perspective for Maori?
1. Treaty of Waitangi
Viewed as a simple nullity,66 the orthodox view on the legal status of the Treaty is that, unless 
it has been adopted or implemented by statute, it is not part of our domestic law and creates no 
rights enforceable in Court. In Te Heu Heu Tukino v Aotea District Mäori Land Board (1941) Vis-
count Simon LC, Privy Council ruled that:67
[I]t is well settled that any rights purported to be conferred by such a Treaty of cession cannot be enforced 
by the Courts, except so far as they have been incorporated in municipal law.
It is the “Principles of the Treaty”68 that are referred to in legislation69 and policy documents70 
rather than the text of the Treaty itself.
2. Principles of the Treaty
Partnership reflects the purpose of the Treaty, where Mäori and the Crown have equal roles with 
“responsibilities analogous to fiduciaries.”71 The principle of partnership is arguably the most im-
portant principle. In New Zealand Mäori Council v Attorney-General the Court of Appeal unani-
mously held that:72
The Treaty signified a partnership between races …”
… the issue becomes what steps should have been taken by the Crown, as a partner acting towards the 
Mäori partner with the utmost good faith which is the characteristic obligation of partnership … [empha-
sis added].
The principle of partnership acknowledges both parties and requires the Pakeha and Mäori part-
ners to act towards each other reasonably and with the utmost good faith. Justice Casey noted that 
the partnership principle required the Crown to recognise and actively protect Mäori interests. 
In his view, to assert this was “to do no more than assert the maintenance of ‘the honour of the 
Crown’ underlying all its treaty relationships.”73 Justice Richardson also agreed that an emphasis 
on the honour of the Crown was important, stating that the concept of the honour of the Crown:74
… [C]aptures the crucial point that the Treaty is a positive force in the life of the nation and so in the 
government of the country. What it does not perhaps adequately reflect is the core concept of the recip-
rocal obligations of the Treaty partners. In the domestic constitutional field … there is every reason for 
66 Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZJur (NS) 72 at 78 per Prendergast CJ. However see also The Queen v 
Symonds (1847) NZPCC(SC) per Chapman J at 390 for earlier recognition of native title at common law and consid-
eration of the Treaty.
67 [1941] 2 All ER 93 at 98; also [1941] NZLR 590.
68 See decision of Cooke P in NZMC v AG [1987] 1 NZLR 641.
69 For example, Conservation Act 1987, s 4; State Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 9.
70 For example, Office for Disability Issues “New Zealand Disability Strategy Discussion Document: Incorporating the 
Treaty of Waitangi” <www.odi.govt.nz/resources/publications/nzds/discussion-document/tow.html>.
71 New Zealand Mäori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR at 664 per Cooke P (CA).
72 Ibid, at 641 per Cooke P (CA).
73 Ibid, at 703 per Casey J (CA).
74 Ibid, at 682 per Richardson J (CA).
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attributing to both partners that obligation to deal with each other and with their Treaty obligations in 
good faith. That must follow both from the nature of the compact and its continuing application in the life 
of New Zealand and from its provisions [emphasis added].
Referring to Richardson J’s comments, Gendall J stated:75
The Lands case recognises that the Treaty created a continuing relationship of a fiduciary nature, akin 
to a partnership, and that there is a positive duty to each party to act in good faith, fairly, reasonably and 
honourably towards the other.
The Treaty principle of partnership requires the Crown to act in utmost good faith, with reasona-
bleness, and to actively protect Mäori interests in order to uphold the honour of the Crown.76 Part-
nership is not determined in a numeric sense, rather, the intention of this principle is to promote 
greater protection of, and participation by, Mäori.
Sir Robin Cooke (as he was then) also noted that the Treaty must be viewed as a living docu-
ment capable of adapting to new circumstances. In this sense the Treaty partnership status of 
Mäori is given a range of legislative expressions, but the reality is that political power is not 
shared equally.77 The Treaty partnership is subject to the constitutional norm of Parliamentary 
sovereignty,78 which gives little status to rangatiratanga (Mäori self-determination). New Zealand 
Deputy Solicitor-General Matthew Palmer summarises the position at the constitutional level:79
Because of the political nature of the New Zealand constitution, I conclude that Mäori political repre-
sentation is the most significant manifestation of the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s constitution 
in reality. This accords with representative democracy and parliamentary sovereignty being fundamental 
norms of New Zealand’s constitution. Mäori political representation relies on representative democracy 
to access influence over the exercise of parliamentary sovereignty. Mäori have managed to convert a 
pragmatic Päkehä80 initiative, the Mäori seats, into a symbolic representation of their own identity and 
political relationship with the State. MMP has broadened that representation and given it real political 
power. This ensures that Mäori have a voice in the constitutional dialogue in New Zealand – in the branch 
of government that speaks the loudest, Parliament.
Palmer does, however, sound a note of caution:81
However loudly Mäori voices are heard within Parliament, that institution is ultimately ruled by the ma-
jority and Mäori do not now constitute a majority in New Zealand. A group of people that consistently 
forms the majority [i.e Pakeha] has few incentives not to exploit, or ignore a group of people that consist-
ently forms a minority.
As a minority in Parliament, Mäori concerns are at the whim of Parliament and, depending on 
political mood, Mäori may suffer. High Court Justice David Baragwanath echoes this point, com-
menting that:82
75 New Zealand Mäori Council v Attorney-General HC Wellington CIV-2007-485-95, 4 May 2007 at [62].
76 Mason Durie Te Mana, Te Käwanatanga: The Politics of Mäori Self Determination (Oxford University Press, Mel-
bourne, Australia, 1998) 183. See also discussion in Kelly Russ “Modern Human Rights: The Aboriginal Challenge” 
(LLM Thesis, The University of British Columbia, 2006) at ch 2.
77 Matthew S R Palmer The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution (Victoria University Press, 
Wellington, 2008) at 85 for an overview of this material.
78 Constitution Act 1986, s 15(1) which states “[t]he Parliament of New Zealand continues to have full power to make 
laws.”
79 Palmer, above n 77, at 291.
80 “Päkehä” is a Mäori word used to describe New Zealanders of European descent.
81 Palmer, above n 77, at 292.
82 David Baragwanath “The Evolution of Treaty Jurisprudence” (2007) 15 Wai L Rev 1 at 10.
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The Treaty should like any other treaty be a mandatory consideration when it is relevant to decision-
making, including adjudication … it is an expression of the rule of law: a statement that Western norms 
do not exhaust the values of society: that even in the absence of entrenched rights we cannot tolerate any 
tyranny of the majority.
Further, Professor James Anaya, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People recently noted:83
From what I have observed, the Treaty’s principles appear to be vulnerable to political discretion, result-
ing in their perpetual insecurity and instability.
Nevertheless this does not detract from the ability of the Treaty principles to provide clarity to 
the rights articulated in the Declaration. The principles of the Treaty could be imported to provide 
clarity and a bridge between the recognition of a right for Mäori and the relevant article within the 
Declaration.
Chillwell J noted that84 “the Treaty is a part of the fabric of New Zealand society” and can 
provide judicial aid in interpreting statutes “when it is proper, in accordance with the principles of 
statutory interpretation, to have resort to extrinsic material”.
During a recent United States Senate Committee meeting Professor James Anaya noted:85
[T]he courts should take account of the Declaration in appropriate cases concerning Indigenous peoples, 
just as federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have referred to other international sources to inter-
pret statutes, constitutional norms, and legal doctrines in a number of cases.
It would then follow that the principles of the Treaty could also, where appropriate, as an aid, pro-
vide clarity and support to the rights articulated in the Declaration.86
C. Status Quo
The Declaration does not create any new rights87 but it is the only international instrument that 
views Indigenous rights through an Indigenous lens.88
The Declaration… will go a long way in consolidating gains made by Indigenous peoples in the interna-
tional arena toward rolling back inequities and oppression. It builds upon numerous decisions and other 
standard setting measures over recent decades by a wide range of international institutions that are fa-
vourable to Indigenous peoples demands…
There should not have been a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, because it should not be 
needed. But it is needed. The history of oppression cannot be erased, but the dark shadow that history has 
continued to cast can and should be lightened.
83 “New Zealand: More to be Done to Improve Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Says UN Expert [James Anaya]” (2010) Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights <www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID 
=10229&LangID=E>. 
84 Huakina v Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2 NZLR 188 at 210.
85 “US Senate Committee Holds Controversial Hearing on UN Indigenous Declaration” (10 June 2011) <bsnorrell.
blogspot.com/2011/06/us-senate-committee-holds-controversial.html>.
86 Despite the requirement for domestic legislative recognition, the Waitangi Tribunal established under the Treaty of 
Waitangi Act 1975 can hear and make recommendations as to claims relating to acts or omission of the Crown that 
breach the promises made in the Treaty.
87 The rights affirmed are those derived from human rights principles that are deemed of universal application, such as 
those contained in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.
88 S James Anaya “International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples” (Aspen Publishers, New York, 2009) at 63.
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The Declaration simply affirms rights derived from human rights principles such as equality and 
self-determination. The Declaration seeks to recognise Indigenous peoples’ rights and contextual-
ises those rights in light of their particular characteristics and circumstances, and promotes meas-
ures to remedy the rights’ historical and systemic violation.89
The significance of the Declaration lies in its effect. The Declaration provides a benchmark, 
as an international standard, against which Indigenous peoples may measure state action. State 
breach of this standard provides Indigenous peoples with a means of appeal in the international 
arena.
Recognised and supported by United Nations member states,90 the Declaration contains norms 
that are already binding in international law. So, the Declaration provides an additional interna-
tional instrument for Indigenous peoples when their rights, such as the right to participate fully in 
decision-making, have been breached. Indigenous peoples can now argue that not only have inter-
national treaties been broken, but a breach of a right in the Declaration has occurred. The available 
remedy is uncertain, nonetheless it would be reasonable to conclude that this would provide an 
avenue to engender effective dialogue between the state and Indigenous peoples. It does however 
provide Indigenous peoples with an international arena to shame or embarrass a government as 
happened on 11 March 2005, when the United Nations Committee on Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination concluded in its 66th session that New Zealand’s Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 
contained discriminatory aspects against Mäori.91
iv. conclusion
The recent support of the Declaration by Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States 
is significant. However, a closer examination of the wording of their official statements under-
mines the nature of the rights, and questions whether these rights are mere hollow rights. Despite 
this, their actions contribute a moral air of robustness to the Indigenous rights articulated in the 
Declaration.
The orthodox position on the Declaration is that it will not be legally binding upon the state92 
unless it is incorporated into domestic legislation. Notwithstanding this position, principles of ad-
ministrative law provide a window to import these rights. Adopting the perspective of Wilton Lit-
tlechild, the principles of the Treaty can be employed to provide clarity and a bridge to the rights 
articulated in the Declaration.
According to Sir Taihäkurei (Eddie) Durie:93
We have completed the trilogy. The 1835 Declaration acknowledged Indigenous self- determination. The 
1840 Treaty upheld it within the structures of a State. This Declaration now confirms it and says how it 
should be applied. As rights go, that’s a big step. It fills the gaps in the Treaty of Waitangi. It is some-
thing, to famously, applaud.
89 Ibid, at 63. 
90 148 member states have adopted/supported the Declaration. Columbia and Samoa have reversed their abstention 
leaving nine states still abstaining. See <www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/declaration.html>.
91 “Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Decision on Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004” Sixty Sixth 
session Decision 1 (66): New Zealand CERD/C/DEC/NZL/1. <www.converge.org.nz/pma/fs110305.htm>.
92 Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (7th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) at 4.
93 Eddie Taihakurei Durie “Address on the Declaration” statement given May 2010, Parliament Buildings.
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Already it has had practical effect. Last week it was the basis for submissions before the Waitangi Tri-
bunal in North Auckland, to support a more principled approach to managing Treaty settlements, and 
before the Maori Affairs Select Committee in Wellington, to support a greater Maori role in Maori policy 
development.
Irrespective of the concerns on the wording of support given to the Declaration, and the legal 
effect of the Declaration, it is without doubt the most significant document that recognises and 
acknowledges the rights of Indigenous peoples. The current perspective of States and United Na-
tions Agencies94 is one of support and willingness to engage and implement these rights. The chal-
lenge ahead will be the practical manifestation of these rights for Indigenous peoples.
94 For example a recommendation from the recent 10th session of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues noted “The Permanent Forum welcomes the World Intellectual Property Organization facilitating a process, 
in accordance with the Declaration, to engage with Indigenous peoples on matters including Intellectual Property, 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore”.
